|
Logician, mathematician, philosopher, and scientist Charles Sanders Peirce (1839–1914) began writing on semeiotic, semiotics, or the theory of sign relations in the 1860s, around the time that he devised his system of three categories. He eventually defined ''semiosis'' as an "action, or influence, which is, or involves, a cooperation of ''three'' subjects, such as a sign, its object, and its interpretant, this tri-relative influence not being in any way resolvable into actions between pairs" (Houser 1998, 411). This specific type of triadic relation is fundamental to Peirce's understanding of "logic as formal semiotic". By "logic" he meant philosophical logic. He eventually divided (philosophical) logic, or formal semiotic, into (1) speculative grammar, or stechiology, on the elements of semiosis (sign, object, interpretant), how signs can signify and, in relation to that, what kinds of signs, objects, and interpretants there are, how signs combine, and how some signs embody or incorporate others; (2) logical critic, or logic proper, on the modes of inference; and (3) speculative rhetoric, or methodeutic, the philosophical theory of inquiry, including his form of pragmatism. His speculative grammar, or stechiology, is this article's subject. Peirce conceives of and discusses things like representations, interpretations, and assertions broadly and in terms of philosophical logic, rather than in terms of psychology, linguistics, or social studies. He places philosophy at a level of generality between mathematics and the special sciences of nature and mind, such that it draws principles from mathematics and supplies principles to special sciences.〔For Peirce's definitions of philosophy, see for instance "A Syllabus of Certain Topics of Logic", CP 1.183-186, 1903 and "Minute Logic", CP 1.239-241, 1902. See Peirce's definitions of philosophy at (CDPT ) under "(Cenoscopy )" and "(Philosophy )".〕 On one hand, his semiotic does not resort to special experiences or special experiments in order to settle its questions. On the other hand he draws continually on examples from common experience, and his semiotic is not contained in a mathematical or deductive system and does not proceed chiefly by drawing necessary conclusions about purely hypothetical objects or cases. As philosophical logic, it is ''about'' the drawing of conclusions deductive, inductive, or hypothetically explanatory. Peirce's semiotic, in its classifications, its critical analysis of kinds of inference, and its theory of inquiry, is philosophical logic studied in terms of signs and their triadic relations as positive phenomena in general. ==Semiotic elements== Here is Peirce's definition of the triadic sign relation that formed the core of his definition of logic.
This definition, together with Peirce's definitions of ''correspondence'' and ''determination'', is sufficient to derive all of the statements that are necessarily true for all sign relations. Yet, there is much more to the theory of signs than simply proving universal theorems about generic sign relations. There is also the task of classifying the various species and subspecies of sign relations. As a practical matter, of course, familiarity with the full range of concrete examples is indispensable to theory and application both. In Peirce's theory of signs, a ''sign'' is something that stands in a well-defined kind of relation to two other things, its ''object'' and its ''interpretant sign''. Although Peirce's definition of a sign is independent of psychological subject matter and his theory of signs covers more ground than linguistics alone, it is nevertheless the case that many of the more familiar examples and illustrations of sign relations will naturally be drawn from linguistics and psychology, along with our ordinary experience of their subject matters. For example, one way to approach the concept of an interpretant is to think of a psycholinguistic process. In this context, an interpretant can be understood as a sign's effect on the mind, or on anything that acts like a mind, what Peirce calls a ''quasi-mind''. An interpretant is what results from a process of interpretation, one of the types of activity that falls under the heading of ''semiosis''. One usually says that a sign stands ''for'' an object ''to'' an agent, an interpreter. In the upshot, however, it is the sign's effect on the agent that is paramount. This effect is what Peirce called the ''interpretant sign'', or the ''interpretant'' for short. An interpretant in its barest form is a sign's meaning, implication, or ramification, and especial interest attaches to the types of semiosis that proceed from obscure signs to relatively clear interpretants. In logic and mathematics the most clarified and most succinct signs for an object are called ''canonical forms'' or ''normal forms''. Peirce argued that logic is the formal study of signs in the broadest sense, not only signs that are artificial, linguistic, or symbolic, but also signs that are semblances or are indexical such as reactions. Peirce held that "all this universe is perfused with signs, if it is not composed exclusively of signs",〔Peirce, C.S., CP 5.448 footnote, from "The Basis of Pragmaticism" in 1906.〕 along with their representational and inferential relations. He argued that, since all thought takes time, all thought is in signs: To say, therefore, that thought cannot happen in an instant, but requires a time, is but another way of saying that every thought must be interpreted in another, or that all thought is in signs. (Peirce, 1868〔"Questions Concerning Certain Faculties Claimed for Man" (''Arisbe'' (Eprint )), ''Journal of Speculative Philosophy'' vol. 2 (1868), pp. 103-114. Reprinted (CP 5.213-263, the quote is from para. 253).〕) Thought is not necessarily connected with a brain. It appears in the work of bees, of crystals, and throughout the purely physical world; and one can no more deny that it is really there, than that the colors, the shapes, etc., of objects are really there. Consistently adhere to that unwarrantable denial, and you will be driven to some form of idealistic nominalism akin to Fichte's. Not only is thought in the organic world, but it develops there. But as there cannot be a General without Instances embodying it, so there cannot be thought without Signs. We must here give "Sign" a very wide sense, no doubt, but not too wide a sense to come within our definition. Admitting that connected Signs must have a Quasi-mind, it may further be declared that there can be no isolated sign. Moreover, signs require at least two Quasi-minds; a Quasi-utterer and a Quasi-interpreter; and although these two are at one (i.e., are one mind) in the sign itself, they must nevertheless be distinct. In the Sign they are, so to say, welded. Accordingly, it is not merely a fact of human Psychology, but a necessity of Logic, that every logical evolution of thought should be dialogic. (Peirce, 1906〔"Prolegomena To an Apology For Pragmaticism", pp. (492 )–546, ''The Monist'', (vol. XVI, no. 4 ) (mislabeled "VI"), Oct. 1906, see (p. 523 ). Reprinted CP 4.530–572; see para. 551 (Eprint ).〕 ) 抄文引用元・出典: フリー百科事典『 ウィキペディア（Wikipedia）』 ■ウィキペディアで「Semiotic elements and classes of signs」の詳細全文を読む スポンサード リンク
|